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The ‘Summer of Discontent’: Exclusion and Communal Resistance at the 
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Abstract
London 2012 promised local small businesses access to lucrative Olympic event-tourism and 
visitor trading opportunities. However, as urban spaces were transformed to stage live Games, 
many local stakeholders found themselves locked out. We focus on one ‘host’ community, 
Central Greenwich, who emerged negatively impacted by such conditions. 43 in-depth 
interviews and secondary evidence reveal that this was a community determined to resist. Few 
papers have extended the concept of resistance to the context of mega-events so we examine 
why communities resisted, and how physical tactics and creative resistance were deployed. 
Although efforts afforded some access for local businesses - they proved too little, too late. We 
present the ‘tactics for resistance’, a series of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics businesses could use to 
encourage proactive, as opposed to reactive, communal resistance required to protect local 
interests and afford access to opportunities generated by temporary mega-event visitor 
economies.
Keywords: Communal resistance, Exclusion, Small businesses, Hard and soft tactics, Host 
community, Mega-event, Olympic tourism, London 2012.
Author accepted manuscript version. Please cite as: 
Duignan, M.B., Pappalepore, I., and Everett, S. (2019). The ‘Summer of Discontent’: 





Mega-events are complex projects that exist and flourish by garnering significant political-
economic support from the upper echelons of government, quasi and non-governmental bodies 
(NGOs) (Chalip, 2017). They epitomise the conscious effort made by sports policy and senior 
managers to catalyse new and existing urban policies and projects. Large-scale development 
projects, like the Olympics, are by and large a ‘choice development strategy’ (Broudehoux and 
Sanchez, 2015) - cities do not have to bid and host them. Years, if not decades, of meticulous 
planning go into preparing a bid, with national organisations like the British Olympic 
Association (BOA) in the UK requiring a mandate from central governments to submit an 
application. However, the efficacy of such projects to achieve initial well-intended objectives 
have been questioned, and critiqued, and a number of hopeful host cities now seek referendum-
like approval from their citizens before bidding (Dempsey and Zimbalist, 2017). This activity 
has, however, illuminated the extent of public resistance against the Olympics, where strident 
international (e.g. DemocracyNow (2018), GamesMonitor (2018), RioonWatch, (2018)) and 
national campaigns, like ‘NOlympia’ in both Munich and Hamburg and ‘No Boston Olympics’, 
have successfully sought to veto government attempts to host (see CityLab, 2017 for a detailed 
case). 
For cities successful in securing the rights to host, a constellation of sports, policy, private and 
public bodies and interests adjoin to execute a project that will significantly impact, and disrupt, 
the day-to-day lives of individuals and collective organisations within and beyond the chosen 
host city. This is particularly so for those situated within close proximity of neighbourhood 
spaces officially chosen to play host. In the preceding decades, and certainly since the turn of 
the 21st century, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and national organising 
committees (NOCs) have placed extensive emphasis on social and economic regeneration and 
development at the heart of project objectives –as both an immediate outcome and a longer-
term so-called ‘legacy’ (see Olympic 2020 agenda – IOC, 2018). Positive developmental 
outcomes intertwine inextricably with moral virtues extolled within the ‘Olympic Movement’ 
itself and inscribed into the ‘Olympic Charter’. The IOC’s overarching aim: to herald a vision 
of ‘respect for universal fundamental ethical principles (…) banishing any form of 
discrimination with regard to a country or person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender, 
or otherwise which is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic movement’ (IOC, 2013: 
54). Yet, Zimbalist (2015) argues that little evidence suggests the Games has served to end or 
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suspend hostility between nations or to improve the relationships between national 
governments and their populaces – in fact, quite the contrary. 
Aptly, conflict of an ideological, political, social and economic nature emerges as a direct result 
of the rather extraordinary conditions that typify the multifaceted unequal developmental 
effects of mega-events (OECD, 2008). Theoretically, such projects have the power to 
‘orientate’, ‘connect’ and ‘integrate’ global (and local) communities (Horne and Manzenreiter, 
2006). However, numerous authors argue that they exacerbate conflict and division within the 
host city (Raco and Tunney, 2010). As a result, the ability and efficacy by which mega-events 
achieve reasonable and [well] distributed developmental benefits is questionable (Viehoff and 
Poynter, 2015). Critical economic geographers like Harvey (1989) argue that entrepreneurial 
projects, speculative in nature with little evidence of positive social and economic returns on 
investment, serve to divert public attention and funds away from fundamental socio-economic 
challenges in the neoliberal city. Zimbalist (2015) claims that mega-events are an ‘economic 
gamble’ that excludes individuals and communities without the social and economic capital to 
participate and leverage such an opportunity. Effectively, they favour those with the influence 
and power to participate (e.g. Horne, 2007), and disserve those less visible who do not (Raco 
and Tunney, 2010). 
Emphasis on certain intended ‘desired’ outcomes may serve as a ‘smoke and mirror’ effect 
(Garcia, 2004), or perhaps a placebo (Rojek, 2014) that conceals parochial interests 
(McGillivray and Frew, 2015). Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) argue that a rhetoric of 
positive local inclusion, community participation and developmental outcomes may simply 
serve to justify the event and help negate resistance efforts across the host nation, city and soon 
to be official event zones. Yet, empirical evidence points to the way such projects may favour 
a narrow sub-section of society - namely those interests that align and intertwine with those 
who wish to profit from the Olympics’ occurrence (Raco and Tunney, 2010). As such, it can 
be argued that project plans are drawn up embodying the ‘sectional interests’ of more desirable, 
prosperous and upwardly mobile citizens (e.g. large-scale business owners and property 
developers) considered ‘synonymous with the well-being of the city’, speaking on behalf of 
their fellow citizens (Gruneau, 2002: 9-10). McGillivray and Frew (2015) therefore question 
the foundational ethical principles of mega-events, and the actions of their policy makers and 
project managers as a far cry from the principled, virtuous departicularised moral positionality 
projected by the Olympic Movement and Charter. Following the Sydney 2000 Games Vigor et 
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al (2004) stated that the Games has seen a progressively ‘fundamental change in philosophy’ 
(2004: 5). We argue, and our empirical analysis suggests that such change represents an on-
going focus toward commercial logic and profit maximisation, whereby mega-events 
simultaneously step back away from (particularly locally rooted) social responsibilities and 
offer an illusion of inclusivity. 
Brazil’s 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio’s 2016 Olympics illustrated such challenges (e.g. Vox, 
2016). South America’s Olympic project received notable media and academic criticism, 
alongside urban protestation found across the city, in touristic areas like airports, and inside 
specific urban zones to be affected by the diversion of funds away from, and displacement of, 
indigenous favela and slum communities (e.g. Strange, 2013; Euromonitor, 2013; O’Neill, 
2014; BBC, 2015). As a result, strategic task forces of Olympic planners (and ‘pacification’ 
forces) took hard, physical action against urban dwellers who refused to be displaced – 
breaking down local resistance efforts (see Talbot’s, 2016 graphic analysis). Yet, somewhat 
ironically, Rio claimed that:
‘… the Olympic Games should serve the city, rather than the city serving the Games 
and to be an ‘inclusive’ Games’ (Rio Candidature File, 2009: 9). 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) argue that such contradictions frequently typify the 
dichotomy between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ in mega-events. However, commentators have 
claimed that there is a significant lack of academic research, and focus on the complex, 
localised and often idiosyncratic urban impacts on host communities and those voices 
marginalised at the heart of Olympic zones, specifically during the live staging periods (e.g. 
McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). We present the case of Central 
Greenwich, an officially designated UNESCO World Heritage site and established as one of 
London’s key touristic sites - home of some of the UK’s leading attractions (e.g. National 
Maritime Museum, Cutty Sark) according to the Association of Leading Visitor Attractions 
(ALVA) (2018). The paper contributes by presenting an in-depth, empirically driven analysis 
of the experiences of one specific small retail and hospitality business community promised a 
summer of event-tourism trade opportunity, yet found themselves unable to leverage. As a 
result, we identify how locals resisted against Olympic strategies designed to restrict them from 
accessing such opportunity. The paper amplifies their narratives, examines through an analysis 
of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics how and why they resisted, and subsequently proposes as series of 
‘tactics for resistance’ for future communities to proactively resist and support the effective 
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(re)distribution of event (tourism) benefits (Ziakas, 2014). As a result, we draw on and advance 
the under-utilised concept of resistance within tourism studies. Specifically, the work of de 
Certeau (1984) is adopted as a means to theorise local acts of resistance towards the ‘strategies’ 
of dominant powers in a mega-event tourism context. We suggest there is insight to be gained 
by applying concepts of local ‘tactics’ to the Olympics to develop a theory of practice that 
considers the relationship between local resistance and powerful strategic manoeuvres.
Empirically driven, this paper is guided by three key research questions:
1) What are the reasons behind local acts of small business communal resistance in the 
‘live staging’ periods? 
2) What are the tactics and resistance mechanisms deployed by small businesses at the 
host community level?
3) How far are such acts of resistance effective in redistributing event-related benefits 
and/or in negating challenges?
Structurally, the following sections provide an in-depth analysis of the specific ways host 
communities, specifically small businesses may find themselves locked-out of event-tourism 
trade opportunities, and how planning practices often transcend and ignore local interests. We 
draw on these economic and spatial exclusions as a prelude to explain why host communities 
have and continue to resist the very presence and execution of mega-events. The literature 
review shifts to a focus on the concept of resistance, specifically how and why ‘communal 
resistance’ has materialised in the context of mega-events. Afterwards, we present a detailed 
methodology, followed by empirical findings and analysis in light of our theoretical frame. We 
close by concluding key conceptual and practical aspects, managerial and policy implications, 
and proposed future avenues of research. 
2. Economic and spatial exclusions of mega-events 
Defined as having a ‘dramatic character’ of ‘international significance’ (Roche, 2000: 1), mega 
events symbolise and manifest as extraordinary forms of event-led policy. They have been 
described as an exogenous shock, serving to fast-track urban policy (Faulkner et al., 2001).  
Catalysing developmental outcomes features as a core objective of all mega-events, and 
emerges as a key direct - and hoped-for - aspect of achieving a successful urban legacy in the 
context of London 2012 (House of Lords, 2013). Yet, speeding up development and execution 
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of policy, may serve to transcend everyday consultative [democratic] processes of inclusive 
and progressive urban governance. Host cities and project actors target places and spaces for 
specific action under the guise of immediate deadlines and short timescales - swiftly and 
effectively. Yet, such processes do not always satisfy the short-term interests of host 
communities at the epicentre of Games planning - particularly during the ‘live staging’ phases. 
Evidence points to the way in which mega-events suspend and supersede existing national law, 
rules and regulations, legal precedence and sovereignty (Siddons, 2012). They effectively 
render certain local laws obsolete, replacing them with the overarching ‘Host City Contract’ 
(HCC): off-the-shelf rules and regulations demanded by the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC). Braathen et al. (2016) simply state that ‘Olympic bid books become the de-facto 
planning documents’ (2016: 262) as power and legitimacy transfer to a new regime of policy 
makers and project actors. As a result, mega-events effectively create what Agamben (2005) 
describes as a ‘state of exception’ under the auspices of being in both the local and national 
interest. Powell and Marrero-Guillamon’s (2012) examination of ‘London’s state of exception’ 
has been influential in examining how mega-events in general, and specifically to London 
2012, have supported the installation of spatial and regulatory controls at the local level – 
conditions that may serve to exclude host communities from accessing opportunity across 
heavily securitised – and militarised – event zones, including Greenwich. The exclusion of host 
communities, across a variety of cases and ways, emerges as a common picture in light of 
mega-event planning, delivery and even legacy.
Host communities may find themselves excluded from Games planning and delivery in a 
number of ways. For instance, through the immediate displacement and removal of 
economically [and politically] vulnerable local stakeholder groups to make way for necessary 
Olympic-related developments (Raco and Tunney, 2010), right through to a legacy of 
gentrification and rising rents (commercial and residential) through, for example, increased 
desirability, marketing of place and infrastructural developments (Vigor et al, 2004; OECD, 
2008; Gold and Gold, 2008). Yet, very little academic attention has examined the ways small 
businesses residing at the heart of Olympic event zones can be excluded during the intense live 
staging of the Olympics – the temporal focus of this paper. This seems surprising as such 
projects demand the sequestration of public space, usually owned by those residing at the local 
level, to fuel the event’s existence – often at the expense of local inclusion (Hall, 2006; 
Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). In the period immediately prior to the Opening Ceremony 
civic spaces (soon-to-be Olympic event zones) are efficiently captured. This act of 
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‘territorialisation’ (e.g. Raffestin, 1980) is effectively where the ‘project territory’ merges with 
that of the existing ‘context territory’. Project territory, to some extent, is the production of 
territory striking an (uneasy) balance between ‘global’, ‘project’ and ‘macro’ needs (e.g. the 
IOC, sponsors, local sanctioning bodies and the event itself etc.), and ‘local’ needs (e.g. nation, 
city, region, locale, community of residents/traders etc). Olympic territorialisation, inasmuch 
as it can be considered the production of new territory-created ‘striated’ space, interweaves its 
project requirements within the existing environment: the ‘context territory’. 
Spaces earmarked for mega-event led development are thus subject to political moves and 
power struggles. One of the major issues is that spaces required for Olympic development are 
often conceptualised as ‘blank slates’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010) ready for ‘wholesale 
demolition’ (Shin, 2013: 7) with ‘little consideration needed for existing activities and 
practices’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2087). Raco (2014) and Raco and Tunney (2010), 
however, suggest that such intervention reflects little understanding of the pre-existing socio-
economic practices that permeate across ‘invisible’ host community spaces, and the 
interconnected networks that localities rely on. Existing academic and policy research currently 
shows that those who need the changes rarely benefit from them (e.g. Zimbalist, 2015; OECD, 
2008). One of the key issues identified is that mega-events often focus on ‘project’ ambitions, 
prioritising more ‘macro’ and ‘city and nation’ objectives in search of a ‘utilitarian’ vision – 
thus limited critical analysis focuses on local challenges bestowed at the host community level. 
It seems that stakeholders are often perceived as existing in low-order suburbs, offering little 
to the economic vitality of the city, and so interventions regularly ignore the day-to-day socio-
economic practices that local communities frequently rely on (Raco and Tunney, 2010). This 
reflects an ironic situation whereby the very communities who formed the intended 
beneficiaries of London 2012’s initial bid, and recipients of a virtuous legacy vision, become 
marginalised. Raco and Tunney (2010) argues that Olympic planning is akin to a
‘… tidal wave crashing over local businesses (…) their low visibility has [in the context 
of London 2012] made them relatively easy targets for ‘decisive action’’ (2010: 2082).
3. Ignoring the ‘host context’
Effectively, ‘the Olympics allow democracies to behave like dictatorships – if only for a short 
time’ (Mohdin, 2016: 1) and seldom facilitate any ‘real’ form of democratic consultation 
(Cashman, 2002). Hiller (2002) argues that, instead of consulting local residents and 
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businesses, project actors often conceive their task as ‘merely informing people about plans 
rather than truly seeking input about these plans from the ground up’ (2002: 104). A key project 
strategy is to seek superficial representation from key community gatekeepers, to demonstrate 
‘wide community consent’ and pay lip service to those who may oppose delivery to neutralise 
threats, avoid dissent and prevent resistance – leading to a continued lack of understanding of 
local issues and localism (Cashman, 2002). Hiller (1998) claims that such processes are 
historically rooted in Games delivery, and frequently uses the Calgary 1998 Winter Games as 
an example of how the Olympics ignores grassroots participation in favour of privileged 
stakeholder interests (also see Miles, 2010). Limited two-way dialogue, according to Hiller 
(2002), inevitably leads to a narrow view of stakeholder interests and promotes a somewhat 
‘singular’ project discourse that frequently ‘fail[s] to be responsive to wider interests and long-
term community needs’ (Mean et al, 2004: 130-131). 
Although events frequently seek support from small businesses and other local communities 
prior to delivery in order to legitimise policy objectives (Foley et al, 2011), the very same 
stakeholders are often unable to obtain action in response to their concerns, following the 
‘principle of who or what really counts’ (Mitchell et al, 1997: 853). Therefore, whilst 
perspectives are encouraged and sought, local narratives are quickly marginalised as the project 
becomes ‘real’ (Gilmore, 2014). As identified earlier the ‘overriding’ of local concerns is 
widely attributed to and justified based on the aforementioned pressures placed on project 
actors to deliver global projects on time and to budget, often justified as a project in the city 
and national interest (Smith, 2012). Becker’s (2008) analysis of the Beijing 2008 Games 
epitomises such regressive, top-down approaches to Olympic policy, planning and delivery, 
creating severely disadvantaged communities through the need to, for example, create space 
for Olympic infrastructure. It is therefore unsurprising that commentators (e.g. Raco, 2004) 
argue that flagship Olympic urban development programmes always promise change, but 
seldom deliver the type of change promised. This includes macro-policy agenda right through 
to the introduction and reengineering of urban infrastructure, local spaces and the very socio-
economic networks that have been argued to underpin high-functioning and sustainable urban 
communities (New Economics Foundation, 2010; UK Government, 2013). 
Horne and Manzenreiter (2006:18) argue that mega-events often prioritise the ‘interests of 
global flows rather than local communities’. Specifically, Miles (2010) claims that they serve 
to appease global consumerist tastes, as opposed to highlighting a cross-section of local interest 
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(and, in the case of small businesses, the ‘local offer’). Yet, the Olympics is a public sector led 
project. Critics therefore argue that considerable public expenditure favours private, namely 
multinational, enterprise (Smith, 2012), and general trends toward the commodification of 
culture have given rise to the increasingly corporatized nature of mega-events (e.g. Tomlinson, 
2006). It has been noted by Boykoff (2012) that security affords mega-events, specifically the 
Olympics the power to colonise and secure official event spaces describing such occasions as 
form of ‘Celebration Capitalism’. McGillivray and Frew (2015) note that such projects 
sequestrate national and cultural assets at the heart of these event spaces to commercially 
exploit them on behalf of external, contingent actors from official sponsors to the IOC 
themselves. Contrary to the rhetoric, mega-events thrive on exclusivity – from elite sport, elite 
cultural production, to the commercial logic of ‘brand exclusivity’ within official event zones 
and across the host city. Mega-events, by virtue of their title, focus on the ‘mega’ over the 
‘micro’ (Clark et al, 2016), the ‘external’ (global) over the ‘internal’ (local), which in turn locks 
out, albeit temporarily, existing small businesses event-tourism trade opportunities. Frew and 
McGillivray (2008) illustrated the exclusionary effects of exclusive commercial spaces at the 
2006 Germany World Cup, and Hall (2006) empirically examined the idiosyncratic 
exclusionary impacts across the city and resultant protests by small businesses and local 
business associations. Nicholas Stucke, President of the German Trade Association, cited in 
Hall (2006), claimed that: 
‘… there won’t be any German products on sale in the marketplaces of the towns where 
the matches are being held … You can get a Coca-Cola, American Beer and McDonalds 
but that will be it (…) German products will be locked out’ (Hall, 2006: 63). 
Although Raco and Tunney (2010) argue that mega-events render local communities invisible 
and ignore local communities, who lack the political and economic capital – and clout – to 
resist and amplify narratives of exclusion, a handful of authors, including Hall (2006) and 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), have empirically identified examples of resistance from 
various ‘host contexts’. Across what can be described as contested Olympic spaces the question 
of how communities can amplify their voice, promote plurality, and identify specific tactics 
and lines of flight to ‘creatively resist’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) and overcome 
exclusionary spatial conditions remains vital, and not fully resolved, in the pursuit of equable 
outcomes. 
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4. Mediated and ‘communal resistance’
In the late 1980s Jackson (1987) expressed concern that the object of resistance was almost 
invisible, and ‘the geography of resistance is one that surely merits the most urgent 
consideration’ (1987: 263). By the late 1990s resistance had become a central theme of 
contemporary social and cultural geography (Pile and Keith, 1997). However, resistance has 
been an under-utilised theoretical vehicle despite its value in exploring and understanding the 
politics of lived spaces and theorising the construction of place (Massey, 1993). For example, 
in seeking to theorise the social impact of tourism, Eichhorn et al (2015) claim the concept 
remains neglected and narrowly applied. Although studies of community and national forms 
of resistance are growing few tourism or events studies fully articulate the spectrum of 
strategies of resistance in the context of the agency of the ‘host’ (Pritchard et al, 2011). Some 
exceptions include the conceptualisation of community resistance by Doǧan (1989) which 
places it centrally in the tactics of local people, and also Joseph and Kavoori (2001) who adopt 
the concept of mediated and ‘communal resistance’ to explain the subversive actions of host 
communities - namely how local people can ‘transform an ambivalent and disempowered 
relationship into one that is culturally acceptable to the host community’ (2001: 999). 
Notably, de Certeau (1984) is credited with examining space as ‘practised place’ i.e. culturally 
specific, symbolic and grounded in social relations of power and contestation. In defining 
‘strategies’ as the purview of power, he theorised places as sites of resistance where opponents 
or dominant forces can be challenged and excluded. For de Certeau, strategy presumes control 
and is self-segregating. His work consequently provides a framework that adopts a more critical 
approach to place. Consequently, in positioning ‘tactics’ as a counter-response to strategies and 
as the purview of the non-powerful, his theorisation provides a means with which to approach 
the concepts of resistance towards the ‘strategies’ of hegemonic powers in a mega-event 
tourism context. There is certainly value in applying concepts of local ‘tactics’ to the Olympics 
to develop a theory of practice that considers the relationship between local resistance and 
strategic manoeuvres. It is the ‘socio-culturally mediated capacity to act’ that Ahearns (2001: 
112) links directly to forms of resistance, where local people act in their interest and use policy 
and law to undertake a form of ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien and Li, 2006) or ‘creative 
resistance’, which Deleuze and Guattari (1987) might theorise as ‘rhizomatic multiplicities of 
interactions, relations and acts of becoming’ (1987: 33).
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If, as Eichhorn (2013) argues, ‘resistance can be seen as a counter-mechanism to overcome 
unequal power structures ... discourses which offer potential sites for resistance’ (2013: 580), 
evidence of the unequal developmental effects of mega-events provides a fresh empirical 
context to demonstrate how resistance can become central to local community responses and 
actions. Critical commentators increasingly question the inherent development and 
management challenges communities face, including forced evictions, removal of vulnerable 
or undesirable stakeholder groups (such as the homeless) and gentrification. The ever-
increasing costs of hosting mega-events, usually largely paid for by public funds which are 
inevitably diverted from other causes, are a common trigger of local resistance. The resonance 
of anti-Olympic movements within international media and social media have hindered 
attempts by candidate host cities to ‘manufacture consent’ (Lenskyj, 2008) through control of 
related media reports. Indeed, lack of public support has led many national Olympic 
committees to withdraw their bids (Dempsey and Zimbalist, 2017). As a consequence, the 
number of cities bidding to host the Olympic Games has reduced from nine for the 2012 Games 
to only two for the 2024 Games. This decline in interest has prompted calls for a new Olympic 
Games hosting model, such as decentralisation to multiple sites with specialised facilities 
(Christesen, 2016), rotation between a few established host cities or the development of one 
permanent site (Short, 2017).
 
Cottrell and Nelson (2011) conducted an analysis of all contestations, internationally and 
nationally, occurring in connection with the Games between 1896 and 2008. Their analysis 
illustrated that protests have not only become more frequent but have grown in their scope and 
level of professionalization across transnational networks, social movements and cultural 
contexts, including ‘DemocracyNow’ (2018), GamesMonitor (2018) and RioonWatch (2018) 
to name a few as rightful forms of resistance. Cottrell and Nelson (2011) note that Olympic 
sport at the transnational level is continuously politicised and critiqued due to the extraordinary 
powers invoked by the IOC and respective NOCs, and the emerging prominence of 
international activist groups. Broudehoux (2015) argues that, alongside physical approaches, 
the fast and widespread use of mobile technologies and social media platforms contributes to 
the rapid expansion, internationalisation and global messaging of political activist groups. It 
also, however, resonates with Roche’s (2000) idea that mega-events play an important role in 
the formation of collective identities and a global civil society. 
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Olympic resistance has rarely been theorised, yet protest against the Games’ management and 
delivery and political activism (which uses the Games as a global platform to raise awareness 
of non-Olympic related issues) have both been objects of violent repression by host 
governments terrified of global media scrutiny. The Chinese government, before Beijing 2008, 
reduced political unrest by appealing to nationalist sentiment and suggesting ‘that embracing 
the Games was not only a civic duty, but also a contribution to the advancement of the 
motherland’ (Broudehoux, 2015:124). In an interesting display of (Olympics-legitimised) 
suspension of the law Russia banned all demonstrations during the Sochi Winter Games 
(Boykoff, 2015). Even in more democratic contexts, such as Australia and Canada, protests 
were silenced or contained during the Games, often through the establishment of ‘authorized 
protest zones’ (van Luijk and Frisby, 2012). This approach simply applies the Olympic Charter 
rule which states that ‘no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is 
permitted in any Olympic sites or other areas’ (IOC 2007: 98 cited in van Luijk and Frisby, 
2012: 344).
Building on Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction (1950), Gotham (2015) argues that, 
whilst top-down mega-events autocratically impose and determine relations and outcomes 
within the space they territorialise, they can be transformed via bottom-up grassroots 
contestation and resistance across platforms where actors compete ‘for access to and control 
over material and cultural resources’ (Gotham, 2015: 33). We use the case of London 2012 to 
examine and extend current thinking on how and why communities resist, and negate 
challenges brought to bear by overlaying complex project demands into local environments. 
As the mask of Olympic hegemony continues to reveal itself with respect to unequal 
developmental outcomes, civic resistance remains as strident as ever against the mere question 
of hosting, serving to thwart quests by governments to achieve mega-event led development. 
The upper echelons of sport governance may wish to reflect on this untenable situation, as the 
longer-term survival of the Olympic movement, project and mega-event is under question.
5. Methodology
Local communities are faced with challenges which are both complex and idiosyncratic to each 
host context; however, narratives of exclusion are seldom amplified. As a result, we selected 
an inductive, in-depth, qualitative case study design (Yin, 2013) rooted within a subjectivist 
ontological and epistemological paradigm (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Our approach 
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aimed to amplify local perspectives and community narratives, and examine exclusion and 
resistance within a specific geographical context, naturally sitting in a critical theorist position. 
Characterised by a ‘single’ narrow frame and ‘embedded’ analysis of multiple stakeholder 
perspectives (Wilson, 2014), and empirically driven, we focus on one host community and the 
retrospective experiences of small businesses which became significantly [negatively] 
impacted in the lead up to and live staging of the London 2012 Games (25 July – 12 August, 
2012). We examined the World Heritage UNESCO site of Central Greenwich, the official site 
of Olympic equestrian events that took part on the grounds of the royal Greenwich Park. This 
area was one of six East London boroughs (municipalities) officially designated to house 
official event zones. Central Greenwich is a densely populated area with a vibrant town centre, 
home to world-class tourist (cultural and heritage) attractions with a close-knit retail and 
hospitality business community – highly dependent on the visitor economy as a driver for local 
economic development. Strategically leveraging established tourist hot-spots and related public 
space is a key feature of mega-event planning (from Central Greenwich for London 2012, to 
Copacabana Beach for Rio 2016). Additionally, the authors became further interested in this 
specific case as it was subject to significant controversy in relation to the decision to withdraw 
Greenwich Park green space from general use by the public for an extended period of time to 
stage live events (e.g. Smith, 2013). All of these factors related to one of London’s key tourist 
destinations and vibrant visitor economies, serve to justify the why Central Greenwich was 
chosen for our case study. 
Primary data in this paper is based on the qualitative analysis of 43 in-depth interviews. Four 
groups of stakeholders (Tables 1 and 2) were involved: i) small retail and hospitality businesses 
(SG1), ii) local authorities and business engagement officers (SG2), iii) business support (e.g. 
London Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)) (SG3), and iv) other 
regional and national level governmental bodies (e.g. Department for Culture, Media, and Sport 
(DCMS), House of Lords) (SG4). The primary data was generated between 2013 and 2014 as 
part of a PhD thesis [reference hidden for blind peer review] and re-analysed by all authors 
against the paper’s specific research questions. Research participants were selected through a 
combination of purposive and snowballing non-probability sampling techniques according to 
specific selection criteria including geographic location, specific knowledge and experience of 
the phenomenon being studied, and direct involvement with the planning and/or delivery of the 
Games. The experiences of small retail and hospitality businesses (SG1) are triangulated 
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alongside the perspectives of three other stakeholder groups (SG 2, 3 and 4). Four specific 
gatekeepers were chosen across the four stakeholder groups:
Stakeholder group, gatekeeper alias and 
interviewee number
Chosen key gatekeeper and justification
Stakeholder group 1 - Local F&B firm, 
Owner (Interviewee #24)
Vocal local resister of the Olympics, 
identified through secondary reports and via 
Twitter. Introduced us to other local 
businesses. 
Stakeholder group 2 - Greenwich Council, 
Business Engagement Officer (Interviewee 
#19)
Provided local information from local 
authority perspective on issues within 
Central Greenwich, specifically related to 
issues and businesses related to the visitor 
economy. Additionally, introduced other 
official Olympic borough local authorities. 
Stakeholder group 3 - Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB), Senior Policy Advisor 
(Interviewee #12)
Co-author of critical post-Games report on 
business challenges, specifically linked to the 
visitor economy that mimicked similar 
challenges for Central Greenwich, and 
introduced other participants. 
Stakeholder group 4 - British Olympic 
Association (BOA), Senior Manager 
(Interviewee #6)
Major actor in the bidding/planning of 
London 2012, with experience of working 
with communities. Provided introductions to 
high level Olympic sport management and 
UK Government.  
Table 1 – Key gatekeepers chosen
Secondary research published between 2004 and 2013 was used to ensure familiarity with 
Greenwich, alongside the wider macro-environment, and to corroborate the primary data. 
These sources include: i) official London 2012 project and policy documentation, ii) archival 
material from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords HC Hansard records of 
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debates and reports, and iii) supplementation by a range of relevant media sources, including 
broadcast, tabloid, regional and national articles. 
The descriptive validity of the results (Maxwell, 1992) was enhanced through methodological 
triangulation (Yin, 2013), which involved data triangulation, stakeholder triangulation and 
investigator triangulation (as all authors contributed to the empirical analysis). Textual data 
was coded using NVivo10, and all authors independently examined empirical and secondary 
data and generated themes using Attride-Stirling’s (2001) Thematic Networks Analysis (TNA) 
approach. The authors then amalgamated themes and agreed the final line of argumentation 
and structure of analysis. These include: i) spatial and regulatory exclusion, ii) local narratives 
of marginalisation, anger and disappointment, and iii) ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ resistance tactics.  
Stakeholder group Description
Stakeholder group 1 (SG 1) Small local firms in Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’.
Stakeholder group 2 (SG2) Business engagement officers across official Olympic host 
boroughs.
Stakeholder group 3 (SG3) Business organisations responsible for the welfare of small 
local businesses around Olympic host boroughs.
Stakeholder group 4 (SG4) High level project actors, key stakeholders who have direct 
or indirect involvement in the planning, delivering or 
lobbying of the Games.
 
Table 2 - Breakdown of research stakeholder groups
 Interviewee alias Organisation and role
Interviewee #1 (SG4) House of Lords, Senior Lord
Interviewee #2 (SG4) Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), Senior 
Manager
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Interviewee #3 (SG4) London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), 
Senior Manager
Interviewee #4 (SG4) UK Government [Shadow Cabinet], Senior Minister
Interviewee #5 (SG4) London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games 
(LOCOG), Senior Manager
Interviewee #6 (SG4) British Olympic Association (BOA), Senior Manager
Interviewee #7 (SG4) Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), Senior Civil Servant
Interviewee #8 (SG4) London Assembly, Senior Civil Servant (a)
Interviewee #9 (SG4) London Assembly, Senior Civil Servant (b)
Interviewee #10 (SG4) London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), Small 
Businesses Advisor
Interviewee #11 (SG3) Confederation for British Industry (CBI), Senior Manager
Interviewee #12 (SG3) Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), Senior Policy 
Advisor
Interviewee #13 (SG3) London Chamber of Commerce, Senior Manager
Interviewee #14 (SG3) London Business Network, Senior Manager
Interviewee #15 (SG3) East Greenwich Business Association (EGBA), Senior 
Manager
Interviewee #16 (SG3) East London Chamber of Commerce, Senior Manager
Interviewee #17 (SG3) Business in the Community (BITC), Senior Manager
Interviewee #18 (SG3) Federation of Small Business (FSB), Regional 
Representative
17
Interviewee #19 (SG2) Greenwich Council, Business Engagement Officer
Interviewee #20 (SG2) Newham Council, Business Engagement Officer
Interviewee #21 (SG2) Tower Hamlets Council, Business Engagement Officer
Interviewee #22 (SG2) Waltham Forest Council, Business Engagement Officer
Interviewees #23 - #32 (SG1) Local F&B firm(s), Owner(s)
Interviewee #33 (SG1) Local retailer, Owner
Interviewee #34 (SG1) Local F&B firm, Restaurant Manager
Interviewees #35 - #37 (SG1) Local F&B firm(s), Owner(s)
Interviewee #38 (SG1) Local retailer, Manager
Interviewees #39 - #43 (SG1) Local retailer(s), Owner(s)
 
Table 3 - List of interviewees
6. Findings and discussions
6.1 Community narratives of exclusion, disappointment and anger
Opportunities for small local businesses located in Olympic event zones were presented ahead 
of the Games, both at policy (e.g. Royal Borough of Greenwich, 2012) and industry (e.g. 
ETOA, 2005) level. Given Greenwich’s role as one of London’s most popular tourist hotspots, 
it is perhaps not surprising that prior to the Games a range of opportunities to capitalise on the 
transient Olympic visitor economy were projected. The Royal Borough of Greenwich (2012) 
explicitly focused on promoting ‘a lasting legacy for the local economy from hosting the 
Games’ (…) [focused on] ‘increasing the competitiveness of local businesses’ (2012: 12). 
Perspectives found in the report, matched those during an interview with a Senior Manager at 
the Royal Borough of Greenwich identifying the potential for mass tourism claiming: ‘one or 
two years before the Games it was said we will have millions of people – spectators, visitors 
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and tourists coming to London and we will have to accommodate that requirement’ (...) and 
that in light of the Games the council was ‘trying to ensure benefits for local businesses, 
particularly in the areas immediately surrounding the Olympics sites’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). 
This was corroborated by several small businesses exclaiming that they were promised a 
‘bonanza’ (e.g. Interviewee #29 (SG1) and approximately ‘between 20,000 – 60,000 people - 
depending up on the event -coming to the town centre to watch the equestrian’ (Interviewee 
#19 (SG2)). Policy perspectives aligned closely with those at the local level, including Gillie 
Bexton, Chief Spokesperson for Greenwich Hospital Estate [main landlord for the majority of 
small businesses interviewed for this study], of whom claimed that’:
‘…everybody’s expectation throughout London with the Olympics was that trade 
would increase with the enormous number of spectators coming to London and that the 
entire Olympic Games would not only benefit the Olympiad but also benefit trade 
throughout London both across London, the West End and in the outlying areas (…) 
including Greenwich’ (BBC, 2012c).
These expectations were perfectly summed up by a small business claiming:
‘...I remember us having opportunities to hear from people who had worked at previous 
Olympics (…) we were thinking ‘great! there’ll be all these trillions of people we’ve 
been told about (…) every six weeks prior we got letters about what to do and how to 
get ready for the Games’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)).
Business opportunities to seize consumer spending, particularly for small businesses within 
specific Olympic boroughs, were thought to be lucrative. A member of Labour’s Shadow 
Cabinet at the time claimed, ‘local businesses expected a killing’ (Interviewee #4 (SG4)) and a 
Senior Legacy Manager at the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) suggested 
that the Games ‘ought to be, generally, for most people a good thing and an opportunity that 
businesses could prosper from’ (Interviewee #2 (SG4)). The idea of a strong local, East London 
legacy was purveyed across a range of official policy reports by the DCMS (e.g. DCMS, 2008). 
Chalip (2004) argues that such ‘immediate leverage’ opportunities form a major component of 
securing positive revenues for local communities and businesses. This opportunity appeared to 
be secured due to the successful Olympic ticket sales effort, evidenced by the purchasing of 
over six million tickets in the run up to the Games (BBC, 2012a).
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As a result, local retail and food outlets were encouraged to invest in extra stock, 
refurbishments and seasonal staff to prepare for the ‘once in a generation opportunity to have 
local businesses on a world stage’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). Qualitative evidence suggests 
investments mostly proved to be an unnecessary waste of resources, and the promised bonanza 
failed to materialise, leading to feelings of deception, discontent and anger. A Senior Manager 
and the London Business Network corroborated this point, stating that: ‘I think the first place 
where they went wrong was telling and raising people's expectations, or the business 
community's expectations, at the wrong level’ (Interviewee #14 (SG3)). A range of factors 
contributed to the lack of positive short-term positive impacts for local businesses that led to 
subsequent communal resistance attempts against London’s Olympic project.
Our analysis reveals that extraordinary local and city-wide security measures associated with 
fears of terrorism and public safety led to an effective transformation of public space and to the 
diversion of Olympic and non-Olympic related footfall through barricades, signage and 
marshalling. Describing event sites in lock-down, the BBC (2012c) at the time reported that ‘it 
was like being in the inner cordon of a crime scene’. As identified in the review Central 
Greenwich and beyond epitomised the type of zero-tolerance policing and heavy securitisation 
and militarisation effects that typify Olympic states of exception. Vice’s (2012) empirical 
analysis illustrated these very conditions, indicating anti-aircraft missiles on apartment blocks, 
shockwave devices with the capacity to immobilise and disable crowds of people, helicopter 
carriers stationed close by on the Thames, and over 49,000 military personnel and 500 FBI 
agents mingling amongst the crowds. From Central Greenwich to the Olympic park event zones 
became effectively sealed off Olympic bubbles, transformed and protected by military zones 
and airport-style security measures. 
Local perspectives from Central Greenwich repeatedly used a range of sci-fi and political 
metaphors to describe the Olympics and reflect on securitised conditions. For example, they 
described Games planning as an ‘alien beast’ that did not ‘interact’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)), a 
‘self-contained satellite’ protected by a ‘forcefield’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)), and as being like 
the ‘Gestapo had landed in Greenwich’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). This was explicitly 
highlighted by one of the co-authors of the original Olympic bid and Chair of the London 
Forum for LOCOG noted, ‘...the major mistake, in my view, was that they simply ignored local 
communities living around them’ (Interviewee #6 (SG4)); and candidly by another Senior 
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Member of the London Assembly who stated ‘there should have been a space for more local 
engagement’ (Interviewee #8 (SG4)). However, our key Royal Borough of Greenwich 
interviewee illustrated how hand-tied they were at the local authority: 
 
‘…as a local authority there is not much you can do about it (…) that is the story 
throughout the Games’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)).
Local government announcements ahead of the Games requested locals, workers and tourists 
to avoid Central London and Host Event Zones to avoid overcrowding. This was noted by 
Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), who claimed that: ‘in the preceding weeks London’s mayor, 
Boris Johnson, ran a campaign inviting people not attending the sporting events to avoid 
Central London and the Olympic Zones unless strictly necessary’ (2016: 350). These 
sentiments were echoed by small businesses interviewed by the BBC (2012c) claiming that 
narratives of fear ‘poisoned people’s minds with terrorism, traffic (…) I have never seen a July 
as bad as this ever’. One small business remarked that:
‘…we could have easily had a game of 5-a-side football and we would not have been 
in the way of cars, pedestrians or anything – it was dead!’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)).
 
Image 1 – Barricaded routes across Central Greenwich (Author images).
As noted by Smith (2013), we found that the privatisation or closure of public spaces such as 
Greenwich Park and tourist attractions (e.g. the Royal Observatory) angered local people. 
Respondents argued that businesses normally benefit from visitor footfall but ‘Greenwich Park 
was closed for three months before the Olympics so all the people who come to Greenwich just 
to the park, which is one of the main royal parks in London, and it was pretty much shut down 
for the spring. So we lost a lot of visitors to Greenwich’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Also, 
‘Greenwich Park closed weeks before the Games started which impacted the number of visitors 
21
coming in to Greenwich’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). Furthermore, the IOC’s strict regulations 
aimed at safeguarding sponsors, including restrictions on the use of Olympic-related keywords 
and symbols, and on the products that can be sold on site (UK Government, 2013), served to 
preclude any form of effective leveraging by local small businesses. 
Repeatedly, sentiments were shared not only across small businesses, but across business 
support organisations, wider policy and media reports. One respondent claimed: ‘how do you 
get some of that magic Olympic dust to rub off on your small business? You couldn’t even talk 
about Olympic kebabs. The Olympics is ‘highly controlled’ and ‘that’s [local regulation] crazy,  
we all have the freedom of speech but we are bound by the five [Olympic] rings’ (Interviewee 
#8 (SG3)). Media reports echoed such conditions arguing that the Games turned into ‘what 
many legal experts consider to be the most stringent restrictions ever put in place to protect 
sponsors’ brands’ (The Guardian, 2012), leading to a critical BBC (2011) conclusion that ‘they 
[existing small businesses across local communities and/or within existing Games venues] may 
just have to sit out these Games on the side-lines’. Later in the report Pierre Williams, a 
spokesperson for the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), stated that ‘LOCOG’s almost 
absurd overzealousness in protecting corporate sponsors from threats that frankly do not exist 
has further weakened small businesses’ views of the Games and the opportunities it would 
bring’ (BBC, 2011). Repeatedly, this view was echoed by small businesses:
‘Consequences of this walking route and barrier from the station was absolutely deadly 
for business’ (…) 50,000 people were managed into the venue and out again without 
having any ripple on the local area (…) it was devastatingly quiet, all you could see was 
the shop owners looking’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)).
The combination of these factors led to, according to the evidence collected, a challenging 
outcome for small local businesses during the peak tourism summer season of 2012 across 
Central Greenwich. Feelings of exclusion, and narratives of disappointment and anger, resulted 
in acts of resistance by the local business community and fuelled a series of what de Certeau 
(1984) might have conceptualised as deterritorialisation ‘tactics’ to emancipate and circumvent 
strategies put in place to manage spaces. Although resistance attempts were found prior to the 
Games in protest against the closure of Greenwich Park (see Smith, 2013, and selection of 
images below), during the live staging phases a series of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics was invoked. 
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Image 2 - Example visual evidence of host and Greenwich borough resistance (Author’s own).
6.2 Hard resistance tactics: physical action and dismantling the barricades
 
Interviewees commented on the ‘heavy handed’ and ‘over planned’ nature of security 
(Interviewee #25 (SG1)) and ‘fortified’ public space (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Although a 
senior manager in the Royal Borough Council illustrated the ‘unbelievable job’ TFL executed, 
he also claimed that controls were simply ‘a bit too strong in places’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)). 
Similarly, a senior policy advisor at the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) claimed that 
small firms were ‘not getting enough footfall into local areas due to LOCOG mismanagement 
in places’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). Local businesses also noted how event organisers ‘wanted 
them [attendees] in as quickly as possible into their events and out as quickly as possible – they 
didn’t want them milling around at all’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). Respondents described the 
flow of visitors as being ‘manhandled’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)), ‘brainwashed’ (Interviewee 
#26 (SG1)), ‘treated like cattle’, ‘sheep’ and ‘idiots’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). They also talked 
about ‘physically marshalling’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)) footfall and ‘bullying’ the public to go 
‘their way’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). From local small business to policy perspectives, one 
respondent from the FSB claimed that the flow of event visitors was akin to a ‘ghost train’ 
(Interviewee #15 (SG3)) where visitors were ‘put in to a narrow band and then ushered down 
Church Street’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). Then, after the live events, ‘they [event visitors] came 
out and they had no opportunity for anything, they were being shoehorned like small school 
children’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). The findings reveal that visitors were unable to leave 
striated spaces and were actively discouraged from engaging with the locale.
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Several locals further questioned why the Olympics created an extended elongated route 
diverting visitors through demarcated zones toward airport style security zones. Claiming these 
spatial arrangements made no sense, small firms noted ‘...It did not seem to make any logical 
sense as to why they have funnelled everyone (…) it is just weird why they are walking all the 
way round’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). These sentiments repeatedly echoed across the 
community. Although perhaps justified by legitimate terrorism-related security imperatives, 
the overarching view was that host space was simply too controlled and unnecessary: ‘they 
don't need to [have the barriers] (…) why have we spent money hiring these blocks?’ 
(Interviewee #26 (SG1)). As a result, the most visible resistance was therefore physical action, 
as according to one small business ‘... I took it [security planning] as positive aggression against 
our shops on the route’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). Interviewees explained how ‘some people 
were so pissed off that they actually manhandled the barriers themselves’ (Interviewee #23 
(SG1)), and that ‘during the Games they considered handcuffing themselves to the barricades, 
that’s why they panicked and we had to have publicity. Most of the restaurants and the people 
at the market got together!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
‘... they [organised community of protesting businesses on the Greenwich Island] 
complained and they took them down. Three days later they took down the barrier’ 
(Interviewee #27 (SG1)). 
Disappointed and angry with local conditions well into the live staging of the Games, 
individuals ‘took it upon themselves to dismantle the barrier and put some signs up to welcome 
people in (…) as these people were just trying to change something’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
Such tactics, alongside organised protests, served as a key method of removing physical 
restrictions from their community in order to stimulate greater local spend across local 
businesses. Repeatedly, small businesses illustrated numerous reactive approaches taken: 
‘It got to the point that we got so furious that we went out into the street and try to talk 
to the stewards and to say this is really unfair and to actually try to direct people, we 
put up a big sign with there is a market here, come through the market’ (Interviewee 
#25 (SG1)).
Empirical analysis further revealed how Central Greenwich saw new temporary pop-up 
ventures (officially sanctioned by the Olympics) set up shop within metres of fixed, permanent 
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business units (SG1). Respondents argued that these external contingent actors related to the 
Games played a major role in displacing the consumption of existing fixed business units 
operating within Central Greenwich. Resistance attempts to remove these temporary non-local 
businesses ensued, with a high degree of success according to several interviewees. However, 
many suggested the action was too little - too late, and commercial harm had already been done 
as a result of this, as well as limited access to event visitors and Olympic trading opportunities. 
‘…there were a number of pop-up coffee shops and it was out of towners who made a 
killing. We all suffered. There were food and cake stalls in front of their restaurants 
selling food. Then [we] went out and moved them’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). 
 
The final dominant theme related to ‘hard’ tactics included direct conflicts between local 
businesses and event volunteers - formally referred to as ‘Games Makers’. Respondents shared 
stories of how small firms actively confronted these actors to alter their marshalling behaviour, 
which included blowing their whistles and directing visitors past the doors of local businesses, 
standing in front of shop windows and closing off local traders from spectators’ view. One 
small business recalled, ‘it got to the point that we got so furious that we went out and tried to 
talk to the stewards to say this is really unfair’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Others argued the 
problems became such that, in order to negate the corralling of visitors, business owners used 
offensive verbal language and came close to physical action against Games Makers situated 
immediately outside their stores.
‘There was a gentleman down here, now out of business, and he actually went out and 
try to … the Olympics had to fight him because they wanted to put a board over his 
shop, they wouldn’t let anyone over the barrier to go into his shop – even when people 
were asking to go in. He said ‘you have to let them into my shop!’ – they [the marshals] 
actually had to restrain him – he was in all the papers and made local headlines, they 
held him back, and he had to get someone to remove them from his doorway!’ 
(Interviewee #38 (SG1)).
 
Locally employed tactics to deterritorialise were clearly visible, although our findings illustrate 
that exclusion and action was often met with zero tolerance and physical restraint afforded 
through extraordinary legal and regulatory conditions within London’s Olympic state of 
exception (Powell and Marrero-Guillamon, 2012). This relationship between imposed 
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conditions and the employment of tactics to resist dominant power structures seems to offer 
fresh scope for critical theoretical development of what de Certeau and indeed Soja (1996:87) 
may regard as demonstrating ‘community, resistance and emancipatory change’. Strategies 
imposed by the project clashed with the local tactics required to circumvent determined 
topologies to access opportunities that had been initially promised. As identified earlier, de 
Certeau (1984) is often credited with examining space as ‘practised place’, i.e. culturally 
specific, symbolic and grounded in social relations of power and contestation. In defining 
‘strategies’ as creating places as sites of resistance where opponents or dominant forces can be 
challenged and excluded he demonstrates the value in work that adopts a more critical 
approach. There is certainly value in taking de Certeau’s work out of its original context (urban 
navigation) and applying it to the Olympics to develop an alternative theory of practice that 
considers the relationship of resistance to strategic mega-event manoeuvres. Clearly, in this 
context, albeit successful in places, reactive action and creative tactics emerged too little - too 
late to fully realise event-tourism trade opportunities induced by the coming of the Games – a 
dominant finding of this paper.
6.3 Softer tactics: lobbying, publicising and politicising local exclusion 
Our findings identify how local stakeholders complemented physical and ‘hard’ forms of 
creative resistance efforts with the use of softer forms of resistance tactics. In a communal 
resistance effort a collective organisation of small businesses lobbied the local council (the 
Royal Borough of Greenwich), local members of parliament (MPs) and the NOC: the London 
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG). Although this was after the event 
small businesses further contributed exclusionary case studies to key national small business 
impact reports arising from the Games, including the Federation of Small Business’ (2013) 
‘Passing the Baton’ report and the London Chamber of Commerce’s (2012) analysis entitled 
‘Small Businesses and the London 2012 Olympics’. One small business owner who led local 
lobbying claimed that ‘once this [barricading and marshalling] started to happen we 
collectively lobbied our local council and MPs and just tried to change some of the behaviours 
of the marshals’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). 
Local authority perspectives (including from a Senior Business Engagement Manager at the 
Royal Borough if Greenwich), claimed that in response ‘the leader of the council got involved 
and changed those requirements to spill over and to cross the streets, to not so aggressively 
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barricade or corral/channel visitors to the park’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). Later on the same 
interviewee described how the local authority was actually on the side of local businesses – 
both embattled against the determining force of spatial and regulatory controls enforced by the 
Olympic project, claiming that they were trying resist stringent LOCOG, Olympic Delivery 
Authority (ODA) and Transport for London (TFL) planning demands, which were instrumental 
in orchestrating the aforementioned exclusionary environments. They claimed that ‘prior to the 
Olympics the council tried vociferously to make sure that LOCOG and ODA requirements 
were controlled and held back to some extent and to compromise for those regulations did not 
have an impact on businesses’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). They also stated that initial proposals 
were ‘truly horrifying’ in terms of ‘loss of parking space and transport flows…’ and thus 
claimed the council ‘pushed back quite aggressively, against what the [initial] requirements 
were’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). However, despite collaborative and separate local efforts by 
both local businesses and authorities they both remained relatively hand-tied, impotent and 
limited in their agency to resist against Olympic planning. Cashman and Hughes (1999) 
examined similar challenges in the case of Sydney 2000, stating that even local authorities 
received ‘very little information on key issues like anticipated transport flows that are often 
vital for the formulation of local transport plans’ (1999: 32). It is therefore no wonder that 
Flyvbjerg and Bruzelius (2002) subsequently claim that there is little evidence that local actors 
- particularly small enterprises - have ever significantly influenced the objectives of high-
profile mega-event projects.
‘There was a lot of lobbying going on and fights (…) we got on BBC News and it was 
just Greenwich is a complete joke. Anyway, then the council had to have meetings with 
LOCOG about trying to relax their barrier policy (…). So, finally, there was breaks in 
the barriers that somebody who was very determined could scoot out from the odd little 
break if they saw it, to be able to cross the road’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)).
In light of Raco and Tunney’s (2010) argument that local communities remain invisible and 
depoliticised, small businesses in Central Greenwich turned to regional and national media to 
amplify their struggle. The findings reveal that during the physical hard tactics taken against 
spatial controls and visitor movement locals invited London and national media (e.g. BBC. 
2012a, 2012b) to witness – and thus comment on exclusionary conditions. One small firm 
noted, ‘so many people were out there demonstrating. Then [a local actor] got in touch with 
the ITV and BBC and that’s when it was on the telly’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1). Tactics to 
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politicise spatial controls proved to be effective in influencing Olympic planning during the 
live event phases, as illustrated by our analysis of several media reports during that time (e.g. 
BBC, 2012a, 2012b, ), and as also confirmed by our interviewees. Firstly, merely the act of 
publicising Central Greenwich on TV proved useful in attracting visitors to the area as 
‘Olympic tourists returned and investigated the area after seeing it on TV’ (Interviewee #43 
(SG1)). However, as hoped for, this tactic appeared to be the most effective in terms of 
transforming local spatial arrangements in favour of local business inclusion. 
‘…the BBC and the ITV did some news reporting and then after that the barriers came 
down – but it was only made possible by the media getting involved – but it was too 
late by then!’ (Interviewee #33 (SG1)).
 
Although resistance attempts achieved part-success in relaxing controls and opening up more 
opportunity for local businesses to secure event-tourism trade opportunity, it was noted by 
some that the damage had already been done. In other words, locals were caught on the 
defensive and could only respond reactively. One interviewee remarked ‘...although after a few 
days we managed to get the council to take down some of the barriers - it decimated our summer 
really’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). This sentiment was echoed by another explaining that the 
‘Council realised that they had made a big mistake and rectified it [the local controls] – but it 
was a bit too late!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). This case illustrates the need for proactive - as 
opposed to reactive - resistance tactics. Our final conclusion section consolidates ideas calling 
for proactive ‘tactics for resistance’, that are both conceptually and empirically informed, to 
offer tactical-managerial ideas for host communities, specifically small businesses to resist 
project strategies that may preclude access to event-tourism trade opportunities promised at the 
local level and used to legitimise the project in the first place. 
7. Conclusions 
Spatial and regulatory controls, as a result of Games territorialisation of Central Greenwich’s 
context territory, served to fuel narratives of disappointment and anger across contested 
touristic-event spaces. The paper unpacks both how and why small businesses caught at the 
epicentre of exclusionary local planning engaged in ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien and Li, 2006) 
and used ‘creative’ and ‘communal’ tactics against the perceived social injustices of London’s 
Olympic project. 
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As a result, we unearth practical and actionable tactics that local communities may wish to use 
to resist in the context of similar conditions that may arise in the planning and execution of 
future mega-events. Differentiation of management techniques into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categories 
(Ling Kuo, 2002) has been well theorised, where ‘hard’ involves the physical management and 
regulatory management of visitors, as opposed to ‘soft’ approaches which use education and 
interpretation (Mason 2005). In furthering and advancing such theorisations, it seems local 
responses to mega-events can be similarly categorised, where (counter) tactics by local 
residents fall into the spheres of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ – as illustrated in the findings, where residents 
imposed almost ‘mirror’ strategies in their responses. Our empirical findings identified a series 
of hard (physical) and soft (influencing) approaches to stimulate change. Although Vigor et al. 
(2004) argue that mega-events entail a series of conflicting narratives and stakeholder interests, 
this case illustrates a joined-up communal effort to stand united to amplify their voice, and 
change their fortunes to access mega-event-tourism trade opportunities. The planned creation 
of positive impacts and legacies for host communities (as opposed to more ad-hoc, 
serendipitous post-event impacts) should be viewed as a tool with which to ‘enable positive 
social change, rectify power imbalances and decrease inequalities’ (Ziakas, 2014: 9).
This empirically-rich paper provides one of the first studies to both identify and present local 
responses to tourism mega-events within a conceptual framework of ‘tactics’ informed by both 
de Certeau (1984) and wider theories of resistance. Firstly, a key ‘softer’ resistance tactic 
outlined the efficacy of lobbying and working closely with local authorities, policy and 
governmental actors and event managers to remove physical restrictions, like barriers and 
marshals that serve to exclude local small business access to mega-event visitor economies and 
related trading opportunities. Related to evidence of external, opportunist micro-pop up 
commercial interests operating within local environments, lobbying local and national 
organisations emerges as vital with regard to protecting commercial spaces where existing 
small businesses operate. If not, as evidenced by this case, outside businesses can soak up event 
visitor engagement and consumption at the expense of engagement with local hospitality and 
retail businesses. Furthermore, small businesses, in a ‘soft’ tactical pincer move, publicised and 
politicised exclusion and local challenges via mobilising the media. 
‘Harder’ tactics to combat immediate physical exclusion served to complement softer 
approaches. Direct targeted dismantling proved to be the most overt – and desperate - resistance 
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tactic invoked, alongside local skirmishes between small businesses and Games Makers 
perceived to be responsible for aggressively marshalling behaviour – seen as a key barrier to 
accessing local businesses and shops. We identified how small businesses, as a result of spatial 
changes, took steps to re-think flows of visitors back into the community through erecting way 
finding signage. Yet, we should clarify that it is important to note that in future mega-event 
scenarios tactics are to be considered in conjunction with localised and official Games guidance 
– to account for contextual differences across host cities. It can be understood that, through 
small firm engagement with these proposed activities, the paper promotes rhizomatic activity 
that open up ‘third spaces’ where small firms identify lines of flight that permit emancipatory 
outcomes, escape the ‘comfortable certainty of planning’ (Pavoni, 2010: 11) and devise spaces 
of uncertainty where territorialising tendencies are less effective, and alternative narratives can 
flourish alongside the event itself.
Yet, although some aspects of local resistance emerge partially-successful - for example the 
politicisation of their plight through national media, the subsequent relaxation of barriers and 
marshalling, and the removal of pop up stalls – much of the damage appeared to be already  
done. Central Greenwich’s host community of small businesses emerged on the back foot, 
caught in a rear-guard action. This research has shown that de Certeau’s concept of ‘strategies’ 
provides us with a lens for the future to identify and isolate exclusionary project practices 
before they manifest and marginalise. This is particularly vital and useful in the context of 
large-scale urban projects like mega-events as they frequently disserve local communities 
through inducing exclusionary environments via the installation of ‘off the shelf’ legally 
backed spatial and regulatory controls. As a result, to some degree, mega-events reliably create 
exclusionary environments, providing host communities and local authorities responsible for 
their welfare with the power to predict – and prepare for – the inevitabilities of being 
marginalised. 
This paper argues that proactivity, as opposed to reactivity may be central for transforming the 
fortunes of host communities, specifically small businesses, who may find themselves in 
similar challenging situations. By doing so may help support more equitable outcomes from 
mega-events. We argue this is forms a key managerial and policy implication for tourism 
stakeholders (especially those residing in well-established tourism contexts like Central 
Greenwich) who may wish to balance both local small business benefits who play a key 
permanent role in servicing visitor economies, and temporary external, contingent event 
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interests like the IOC and official sponsors. Considering this, and utilising examples of ‘tactics 
for resistance’, communities may wish to equip themselves with tactics to resist large-scale, 
autocratic, top-down mega-event projects with a history of marginalising existing host 
community stakeholders and poorly consulting with small businesses in any sort of meaningful 
way. 
Although some of the evidence presented suggests sparks of proactivity on behalf of the local 
community we argue that proactive tactics to include host community stakeholders should be 
undertaken by all four stakeholder groups who partook in interviews for this paper (namely, 
local authorities, business support organisations, policy and government, and project and sports 
management stakeholders). Joined up thinking across all these groups, and the recognition that 
local communities may often find themselves excluded, is vital in re-thinking the spatial 
planning required to stage sports events within newly territorialised Olympic venue areas at the 
heart of neighbouring communities. We argue that by doing so may provide more inclusive 
leveraging strategies at the local level. This is an explicit research aim of this paper, and is 
important in light of Taylor’s (2007) concern that local communities are often reactive to early 
bid, planning and delivery phases, responding to perceived direct threat, as opposed to being 
proactive.
Echoing the work of Horne and Manzenreiter (2006), who argue that mega-events can 
contribute to the ‘naturalisation of social inequalities’ (2006: 18), we have suggested that 
powerful event-organising institutions are often dominating consciousness, determining action, 
producing and reproducing society through project-particular ideology in the context of the 
event spaces. However, as project practices become exposed and communities resist – as 
evidenced here, and continually found in other mega-event contexts – we argue that the 
legitimacy and allure of the Olympic movement, project and mega-event is under scrutiny and 
question as we move further into the 21st century. The soft and hard ‘tactics’ articulated in this 
paper serve to provide a practical translation of alternative engagement between mega-event 
governance structures and policy, and local communities. Through local resistance and 
pressure on mega-events to balance interests, such projects may be able to avoid another 
‘summer of discontent’ during what should have been a celebration of sport, and an engine for 
promoting international peace, tolerance and understanding. 
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